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This paper presents a positive theory about the contractual form of procurement contracts
under cost uncertainty. While the cost of manufacture is uncertain it can be controlled,
to an extent depending on the eﬀo r te x e r t e db yt h ea g e n t .T h ee ﬀo r te x e r t e db yt h ea g e n t
is not contractible but causes disutility to the agent. Hence, the amount of eﬀort exerted
depends on the power of incentives built into the terms of reimbursement agreed to in
the contract. The analysis in the paper explicitly models the possibility that the belief
about the cost uncertainty is ambiguous, in the sense that belief is described by a set of
probabilities, rather than by a single probability. This allows us to incorporate ambiguity
aversion (behavior of the kind seen in Ellsberg’s "paradox") into the players’ objective
functions. The paper ﬁnds that, provided the agent is more averse to ambiguity than the
principal, the more the ambiguity of belief the lower the power of the optimal incentive
scheme. The ﬁx-price contract is optimal if there is no ambiguity, but if the ambiguity is
high enough a cost-plus contract is optimal; in between, a cost-share scheme is optimal.
It is contended that the ﬁnding is particularly useful in explaining facts about the wide
use of cost-plus and similar low powered contracts in research and development (R&D)
procurement by the U. S. Department of Defense.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: D800, D810, D820, D890
Keywords: Procurement contracts, incentive contracts, uncertainty aversion, Ells-
berg’s paradox, cost reimbursement contracts, cost-plus contracts, ﬁxed price contracts1 Introduction
This paper presents a positive theory about the contractual form of procurement contracts
under cost uncertainty. The two parties to the generic procurement contract considered
are the principal, say the Department of Defense (DoD) which wishes to buy a unit item,
and the agent, say a defense contractor ﬁrm which will manufacture and supply the item.
The parties agree to terms of reimbursement and delivery in the contract. The contractor
undertakes manufacture of the item after signing the contract and at the time of signing
the cost of production is not known for sure to either party. However, while the cost of
manufacture is uncertain it can be controlled, to an extent depending on the eﬀort exerted
by the agent. The eﬀort exerted by the agent is not contractible but causes disutility to
the agent and hence, its extent depends on the power of incentives built into the terms
of reimbursement agreed to in the contract. As is usual in the literature, we assume that
both the government and the ﬁrm are risk neutral. What is diﬀerent in this paper is the
analysis of the consequences of the possibility that the parties’ beliefs are ambiguous and
that they are ambiguity averse. The principal ﬁnding is that the greater the ambiguity
and greater ambiguity aversion of the agent relative to that of the principal, the lower the
power of the incentive scheme in the optimal contract.1 Indeed, if the ambiguity is high
enough or the relative ambiguity aversion of the agent high enough, then the form of the
optimal contract is a cost-plus contract. It is contended that the ﬁnding is particularly
signiﬁcant in understanding the wide use of cost-plus and similar low powered contracts
in research and development (R&D) procurement.
Savage’s theory (Savage (1954)) of subjective expected utility maximization (SEU) is
the received paradigm used for modelling decision-making under subjective uncertainty.
A main implication of SEU is that a decision maker (DM) behaves as if his subjective
assessment of likelihoods of uncertain events may be described by a precise and unique
probability distribution. It is often the case, however, that a DM’s knowledge about the
likelihood of contingent events is consistent with more than one probability distribution,
i.e., beliefs are ambiguous. But, does how precisely he knows the relevant odds inﬂuence
the choice of the typical DM? Ellsberg’s classic contribution (Ellsberg (1961)) laid the
ground for showing that it does: imprecise information about odds aﬀected behavior in a
pervasive way: most preferred to bet on events with unambiguous rather than ambiguous
odds.2 People adjusting their decisions depending on how well they know the relevant
odds and acting with greater wariness the more vague their knowledge of the odds, is a
commonly observed attitude, and has been termed ambiguity aversion.3 Ceteris paribus,
1The result, strictly interpreted, does not require either the principal or the agent to be ambiguity
averse, but just the agent be more averse than the principal. Hence, the analysis applies to the case of
a ambiguity neutral principal and ambiguity averse agent.
2Ellsberg presented a pair of examples of thought experiments, now famously called Ellsberg "para-
doxes", which showed that there were circumstances where it would seem reasonable for decision makers
to let their behavior be aﬀected by their knowledge of how well they knew the relevant odds. Ellsberg’s
conjecture about how most people would behave in such experiments have been borne out in subsequent
formal experimental work. See Camerer and Weber (1992) for details.
3An alternative terminology for ambiguity aversion is uncertainty aversion, a term used in the pio-
neering papers of this literature, Gilboa (1987), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), Schmeidler (1989). The
term ambiguity aversion goes back a long way too, at least to Ellsberg (1961); recently, many researchers
have returned to this term, as for instance, Epstein and Zhang (2001) and Ghirardato and Marinacci
(2002).
1an ambiguity averse DM will be averse to acts with payoﬀs that are crucially contingent
on events about whose odds the DM has a relatively poor idea of, just as a risk averse
agent shies away from risky acts.
If a DM’s belief is ambiguous his knowledge is consistent with more than one prob-
ability distribution (over the relevant state space). Hence, formally, ambiguous belief is
represented by a (convex) set of priors, rather than a single prior. Therefore, given an act
with state contingent payoﬀs, there would be an interval of expected payoﬀso ft h ea c t
consistent the DM’s knowledge. Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), was one of the pioneering
contributions that showed how one may in incorporate ambiguity aversion into decision
making. In Gilboa-Schmeidler’s model, the DM evaluates an act by the minimum ex-
pected payoﬀ consistent with his knowledge. In this paper we invoke a generalization
of that model, axiomatized in Ghirardato, Maccheroni, and Marinacci (2002), wherein
an act is evaluated by a weighted sum of its minimum and maximum possible expected
payoﬀs, given the set of priors. The DM is considered to be more ambiguity averse the
greater the weight he puts on the minimum as opposed to the maximum expected payoﬀ.
Reimbursement schemes incorporated in procurement contracts vary in the power of
incentives delivered. In the "cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee" contract or, more simply, the "cost-plus"
contract, the government pays the contractor the realized cost and plus a fee ﬁxed ex
ante. The cost-plus contract lies at the lower end of the spectrum delineating the power
of commonly used incentive schemes. Because in such a contract the full realized cost
is reimbursed the agent has no incentive to expend eﬀort at reducing the cost. At the
opposite end of the spectrum is the "ﬁrm ﬁxed-price" contract or, more simply, "ﬁxed-
price" contract. A ﬁxed-price cost incorporates very high powered incentives since it
eﬀectively makes the agent a residual claimant for the entire amount of the cost reduction
achieved through the application of eﬀort. In between these two extremes lie what are
sometimes called "incentive" or "cost-share" contracts, in which the contractor and the
government share the realized costs according to some predetermined sharing rule.
In this paper we consider contracts in which the reimbursement is linear in the realized
cost: the reimbursement P = δ+γC; C is the realized cost and δ,γ are constants speciﬁed
in the contract. Notice, γ =0corresponds to a ﬁxed price contract while γ =1gives
the cost-plus contract; when 0 <γ<1 we have the incentive contracts. The principal
chooses δ and γ to maximize the surplus between the value of the item and the (expected)
reimbursement. We assume that the principal and agent are symmetrically informed
about the cost uncertainty at the time of writing the contract; their respective belief
is described by a (possibly non-singleton) set of priors. The main result in the paper
establishes, assuming that the agent is more averse to ambiguity than the principal, that
the optimal γ is zero when there is no ambiguity, i.e., belief is described by a single prior,
but increases monotonically to one as ambiguity increases, in the formal sense that the
set of priors used to describe beliefs expands. Thus ﬁxed price contracts are optimal
when there is no ambiguity and cost-plus contracts become optimal when ambiguity
is high enough. Results in the paper also show that if the principal and agent have
(quantitatively) identical attitudes to ambiguity, the optimal contract is a ﬁxed price
contract. More generally, the more averse the agent’s attitude to ambiguity relative to
the principal’s the larger the γ, and hence, the greater the role of ambiguity in reducing
the power of the contracted incentive scheme.
An intuition for the results is as follows. Assuming the cost uncertainty is ambiguous,
2there is an interval of expected cost values (to ﬁx ideas, it might help to think of this
as a range of cost estimates). The key point to note (assuming that the agent is more
averse to ambiguity than the principal) is that the principal’s (ex ante) evaluation of the
surplus from a contract incorporating a particular cost reimbursement scheme, will put a
comparatively smaller weight on the high end of the interval of estimated costs, compared
to the agent’s evaluation. The next point to note is that the smaller the γ the greater the
reimbursement amount that is ﬁxed up front and based on ex ante evaluation of costs.
Under a ﬁxed price contract, i.e., γ =0 , the agent has the maximum possible incentive
to apply eﬀort to reduce costs; the payment being ﬁx e du pf r o n t ,t h ea g e n tg e t sk e e p
every cent of cost reduced by his eﬀort. However, under a ﬁxed price contract, given that
the agent’s participation constraint has to be satisﬁed, the agent has to be reimbursed
corresponding to a cost evaluation that is considered excessive by the principal. This
is so because the principal, being less ambiguity averse than the agent, evaluates costs
less pessimistically than the agent (the agent applies a relatively higher weight, than the
principal, to more pessimistic/conservative beliefs). By reducing the ﬁxed price portion
and increasing the proportion paid ex post, i.e., increasing γ, the principal reduces the
amount he has to pay based on ex ante cost estimates and increases the amount paid
base on realized costs. Hence, by increasing γ the principal reduces the "ambiguity
premium", the "extra" he has to pay corresponding to the relatively more pessimistic
ex ante evaluation by the agent. Of course, this comes at the expense of decreasing the
cost reducing eﬀort. The trade oﬀ goes increasingly in favor of eﬀecting a reduction in
ambiguity premium as ambiguity increases (or as the ambiguity aversion of the agent
relative to the principal increases). Indeed, with ambiguity high enough the contract is
fully cost-plus, i.e., γ =1 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes some
institutional detail, empirics and ﬁndings reported in the related economic literature,
relating to procurement contracting, that motivate this exercise. Section 3 brieﬂy explains
some technical details of the model of ambiguity aversion applied in the contacting model.
Section 4 presents the formal contracting model and its analysis. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
2T h e m o t i v a t i o n
Why might this exercise, showing the connection between ambiguity and cost-plus con-
tracts (and more generally, between ambiguity and low-powered cost reimbursement con-
tracts) be of interest? Principally, because it provides a good explanation for the long
and widely observed link between cost uncertainty and the intensive use of cost-plus (and
similar low powered contracts) in R&D procurement, especially by the U.S. Department
of Defense (DoD).4 The view that this link is very strong is prominent amongst analysts.
4In 1960, 40.9% of U.S. military procurement dollars involved cost-plus contracts, 13.6% incentive
contracts, and 31.4% ﬁxed price contracts (Laﬀont and Tirole (1993), page 12). While use of cost type
contracts has declined somewhat over the years, the usage continues to be more than signiﬁcant. In
1998, fairly representative of the trend in the 90s, the cost reimbursement type accounted for just over
40% of the total value of DoD Prime Contract Awards while about 16% were cost plus ﬁxed fee type.
The total dollar value of R&D awards (procured domestically) amounted to $19.6 billion in 1998, which
was 17.3% of the total value of defense procurement. Of the $19.6 billion, "educational and non-proﬁt
3Consider, for instance, the following remarks (on page 145) in the standard reference on
defense procurement, Scherer (1964):
R&D work is generally accompanied by signiﬁcant cost uncertainties, and
rightly or wrongly, cost reimbursement contracts have traditionally been cho-
sen to cover such activities. For example, in the major hard goods category
for ﬁscal year 1960, roughly 93% by dollar volume of Navy R&D contracts,
but only 17% of production contracts were of the cost reimbursement type.
... A time-series analysis for ﬁscal years 1956 through 1962 suggests that
the percentage of all military procurement obligations made under cost reim-
bursement contracts (Y ) was an increasing linear function of the percentage
of all awards going to experimental, developmental, test, and research work
(X):
Y =1 9 .29 + .917
(.214)
X;
with r2 of .85.
A more modern day classic on the same subject, Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) reiterates
this view thus (page 12):
One must be careful to distinguish among stages of the procurement life cycle
in this respect. A stylized fact is that low-powered contracts are employed
much more in the early phase of the life cycle. Another stylized fact is that
low-powered contracts are also more employed for high technology than for
nonstandard equipment.
Other analysts of defense procurement policy have observed similarly, (see e.g.: Baron
(1993), page 8; Fox (1974), pages 230-31; Reichelstein (1992), page 713; Rogerson (1994),
page 67). Finally, it is worth noting how deeply entrenched this view is in practition-
ers’ minds as well. For instance, the Federal Acquisitions Regulation (FAR) guidelines
(followed by DoD), regarding choice of contract type in procurement, notes:5
Subpart 16.301-2: Cost-reimbursement contracts are suitable for use only
when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit costs to
be estimated with suﬃcient accuracy to use any type of ﬁxed-price contract.
institutions" and "small business ﬁrms" accounted for only $4.5 billion; hence, approximatedly 77% of
the total dollar value fo R&D procurement in 1998 went to large ﬁrms. In 2000, the most recent date for
which these statistics are publicly available, about 80% (in value terms) of the "cost-plus ﬁxed award fee"
contracts were priced under $20 million (approximately 99.7% of the number of cost-plus ﬁxed award fee
contracts awarded).
The top three companies taking in the most DoD procurement dollars in 2002 were Lockheed Mar-
tin (' $17 billion), Boeing (' $17 billion) and Northrop Grumman (' $9 billion). These three
also happened to be top three ﬁrms in R&D procurement in 2002, together accounting for more
than 41% (in value) of contracts awarded. (Statistical information on recent procurement activity
by DoD, including details mentioned in this footnote may be found on the Procurement Home Page,
http://www.dior.whs.mil/peidhome/PEIDHOME.HTM).
5The documentation may be found at the following URL: http://www.arnet.gov/far/loadmainre.html
4Subpart16.306: A cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee contract permits contracting for ef-
forts that might otherwise present too great a risk to contractors, but it
provides the contractor only a minimum incentive to control costs.
(b) Application.
(1) A cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee contract is suitable for use when the conditions
of 16.301-2 are present and, for example-
(i) The contract is for the performance of research or preliminary explo-
ration or study, and the level of eﬀort required is unknown; or
(ii) The contract is for development and test.
(2) A cost-plus-ﬁx e d - f e ec o n t r a c tn o r m a l l ys h o u l dn o tb eu s e di nd e v e l o p -
ment of major systems (see Part 34) once preliminary exploration, studies,
and risk reduction have indicated a high degree of probability that the devel-
opment is achievable ... .
The FAR guidelines on R&D contracting practice (Subpart 35.006: Contracting meth-
ods and contract type), note:
(c) Because the absence of precise speciﬁcations and diﬃculties in esti-
mating costs with accuracy (resulting in a lack of conﬁdence in cost esti-
mates) normally precludes using ﬁxed-price contracting for R&D, the use of
cost-reimbursement contracts is usually appropriate (see Subpart 16.3). The
nature of development work often requires a cost-reimbursement completion
arrangement.
(e) Projects having production requirements as a follow-on to R&D eﬀorts
normally should progress from cost-reimbursement contracts to ﬁxed-price
c o n t r a c t sa sd e s i g n sb e c o m em o r eﬁrmly established, risks are reduced, and
production tooling, equipment, and processes are developed and proven. ... .
Hence, it would appear that analysts and practitioners alike are of the view that
(cost) uncertainty is the key reason for the intensive use of cost-type contracting in R&D
procurement. What is a less settled issue, and perhaps more to the point, is the question
of the precise mechanism by which uncertainty exerts its signiﬁcant inﬂuence on contract
design in the case of R&D procurement. To put it more simply why, precisely, does
uncertainty matter? The answer that this paper provides is that eﬀect of uncertainty,
at least in the instance of R&D contracting, works through the mechanism of ambiguity
aversion. Projects involving new and untried technologies as well as projects located at
the early part of the product life cycle are very good examples where cost uncertainty can
be described as ambiguous. In such projects the uncertainty is one borne out of lack of
substantive experience; where the novelty of the situation, lack of relevant data, makes it
diﬃcult to conﬁdently assign "ﬁrm" probabilities to the possible (cost) outcomes. Hence
the view that ambiguity aversion has potential to play an important role in such contexts.
There are alternative theories of the link between uncertainty and cost-plus (and other
cost type) contracts. One theory is based on the hypothesis of asymmetry of information;
i.e., ex ante ﬁrms have more information than the principal, the government, and can
forecast the costs better because of this private information. Thus the principal has
to trade oﬀ (information) rent extraction concerns with the concern about provision
of incentives for eﬃcient allocation of cost reducing eﬀort. It may be optimal for the
5principal to provide low powered incentives if the information rent is substantial, as it
would be if information asymmetry is high. (See Laﬀont and Tirole (1993) Chapter 2 for
an account of the theory.) A second theory works on the logic of risk sharing. It rests
on the hypothesis that ﬁrms are risk averse and the government is risk neutral (or, at
least less risk averse than the ﬁrms), and that ﬁrms seek insurance when forecast errors
are substantial. A cost-plus contract provides this insurance. A third and rather novel
theory, advanced recently in Bajari and Tadelis (2001), explains cost plus contracting
on the basis that it minimizes time to completion (compared to ﬁxed price contracts) in
complex construction projects where periodic changes in design are only to be expected.
While cost uncertainty is not an explict parameter here, it could be argued that project
complexity and construction change orders do contribute signiﬁcantly to cost uncertainty.
Next, we discuss how these theories apply to the case of R&D procurement.
The ﬁrst alternative, which hinges on asymmetry of information rather than uncer-
tainty per se, would appear to be better at explaining the cost-plus contracting seen at
later stages of the production cycle than that at the initial research and development
phase. (While cost-plus is not the predominant contracting form at the later stages, as
one might guess recalling the second stylized fact mentioned by Laﬀont and Tirole (1993),
there are instances of it being used.) The asymmetry of information about costs, between
t h eg o v e r n m e n ta n dt h eﬁrm, is arguably minimum at the initial pilot phase when rel-
evant information is scarce all around. Obviously, the information asymmetry should
increase as the ﬁrm works through the research and development phase and hence would
be a good explanation for the low powered incentives that sometimes remain in place
in follow-on contracts after the research and development work has been undertaken.
(Though, Bajari and Tadelis (2001) argue that this is not even a good explanation for
cost-plus contracts in later stages of the procurement cycle.) In any case, it is a lot harder
to argue that asymmetric information is more inﬂuential factor in the initial phase, when
the ﬁrm has not had the time/opportunity to acquire signiﬁcant private information.
The problem with the second theory, based on risk aversion of ﬁrms, is that it fails
to account for the substantial proportion of relatively low priced cost-plus contracts in
R & Dt h a ta r et a k e no nb yl a r g ec o r p o r a t eﬁrms. Evidently, the vast majority of cost-plus
contracts are priced relatively low, below $20 million (see footnote 4). R&D contracts
are usually cost-reimbursement type, as the evidence in Scherer (1964), quoted earlier,
and the FAR guidelines suggest. And, R&D cost-plus contracts are typically lower priced
than cost-plus contracts in other categories.6 Also, a substantial proportion of R&D
contracting is undertaken by large ﬁrms.7 There are a couple of instances in which it
6Tables 9-12 (pages 36-39) in Moore (1962) show the size distribution of a statistical sample of 2501
cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee contracts (completed between 1956-58) in four product ﬁelds. The four are: airframes
and engines, missiles, electronics and R&D contracts. Clearly, the preponderance of small-sized CPFF
contracts is most marked in the case of R&D: 88% of R&D contracts were priced below $1 million.
7The statistics quoted in footnote 4 provides reasonable, albeit indirect, indication of this. More direct
evidence may be obtained by looking through the records of contract announcements in DefenseLINK
News Contract Announcements (http://www.defenselink.mil/contracts/). Indeed, even a casual perusal
reveals signiﬁcant numbers of R&D cost plus contracts priced under $20 million awarded to large cor-
porate ﬁrms. Looking at R&D cost-plus contract awards reported in April 2003, we ﬁnd individual
such awards going to contractors such as Lockheed Martin ($8 million; #F33615-03-C-1400), Boeing
($18million; #F33657-98-D-0002-RJ12-09), Northrup Grumman ($15 million; N00014-03-C-0209). Re-
call, annual turnover of each of these ﬁrms from defense contracting alone runs into several billion dollars.
6might be reasonable to assume that a ﬁrm may act risk averse. One, if the risks are large
relative to ﬁrm size and two, if there are inadequate opportunities for diversiﬁcation. But
many instances of R&D cost-plus contracting would not match either of these instances.
The facts, as already noted, suggest many defense contractors are among the biggest of
the corporate giants there are and most R&D cost-plus contracts involve relatively small
sums. Finally, the risks involved in these projects (i.e., high tech projects) are, in the
most part, risks that are idiosyncratic to the project (these are not risks following from
shocks to aggregate economic activity) and therefore fulﬁll the conditions required by the
standard arguments for diversiﬁcation.
The ﬁnal theory, as suggested in the paper itself, is arguably more appropriate for
projects involving long-drawn, big budget construction, a feature that is but rare for
R&D/early pilot phase projects, which usually involve researching techniques/designing
prototypes/drawing up blue prints. Actual construction/implementation typically follows
in the later stages of the procurement life cycle.
These reasons suggest that the alternative theories do not explain the link between
cost uncertainty and the intensive use of cost type contracts in R&D procurement very
well and hence, the "room" for the ambiguity theory. Of the three theories, clearly, the
ambiguity based explanation is closest in spirit to the risk based theory. Hence, the case
for the ambiguity theory would be strengthened if it could be shown that the theory is not
susceptible to the diversiﬁcation argument in the way the risk based theory is. Indeed,
as it happens, it is not. But this is easier to see after gaining some familiarity with the
technicalities of the ambiguity aversion model and the way it applies to the contracting
context. Hence, we postpone discussion on this till (the end of) Section 4.
3 Modeling ambiguity aversion
A classic experiment illustrating how ambiguity aversion may aﬀect behavior,d u et o
Daniel Ellsberg (1961), runs as follows:
There are two urns each containing one hundred balls. Each ball is either red
o rb l a c k . T h es u b j e c t sa r et o l do ft h ef a c tt h a tt h e r ea r eﬁfty balls of each
color in urn I.But no information is provided about the proportion of red and
black balls in urn II. One ball is chosen at random from each urn. There are
four events, denoted IR, IB, IIR, IIB, where IR denotes the event that
the ball chosen from urn I i sr e d ,e t c .O ne a c ho ft h ee v e n t sab e ti so ﬀered:
$100 if the events occurs and $0 if it does not.
The modal response is that a subject prefers every bet from urn I (IR or IB)t oe v e r y
bet from urn II (IIR or IIB). That is, the typical revealed preference is IB Â IIB and
IR Â IIR. (The preferences are strict.) Clearly, DM’s beliefs about the likelihood of the
events, as revealed in the preferences, is not consistent with a unique probabilistic prior.
The story goes: People dislike the ambiguity that comes with choice under uncertainty;
they dislike the possibility that they may have the odds wrong and so make a wrong
choice (ex ante). Hence they go with the gamble where they know the odds – betting
from urn I.
7Two pioneering contributions, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) and Schmeidler (1989),
developed the maxmin expected utility (MEU) and the related Choquet expected utility
model (CEU), respectively, as possible formalizations of decision behavior that incorpo-
rates ambiguity aversion. In these models, roughly put, the agent’s belief is captured
not by a unique probability distribution, in the standard Bayesian fashion, but instead
by a set of probabilities. The agent’s belief is ambiguous in the sense that more than
one probability is consistent with his knowledge. Thus not only is the outcome of an act
uncertain but also the expected payoﬀ of the action, since the payoﬀ may be measured
with respect to more than one probability. In these models an ambiguity averse deci-
sion maker evaluates an act by the minimum expected payoﬀ that may be (subjectively)
associated with it.
More formally, let Ω = {ωi}
N
i=1 be a ﬁnite state space, and suppose that the decision
maker (DM) chooses among acts with state contingent payoﬀs, f : Ω → R. Like with
SEU, payoﬀsa r eg i v e nb yautility function u : R+ → R,u 0 (·) ≥ 0,w h i c hi n c o r p o r a t e s
the DM’s attitude to risk and wealth. The DM’s subjective belief is described by a convex
set of probabilities Π, with the generic element π :2 Ω → [0,1]. The ambiguity of belief
about an event E ⊆ Ω is given by maxπ∈Π π(E) − minπ∈Π π(E). The MEU functional









It is instructive to note how this functional accommodates the modal behavior seen in
the Ellsberg experiment. For instance, let π(IR)=π(IB)=0 .5 for all π ∈ Π; but
minπ∈Π π(IIR)=m i n π∈Π π(IIB) < 0.5. It follows that the expected payoﬀ from betting
on IR ≡ EΠ (u(IR)) = EΠ (u(IB)) = u(50); while, EΠ (u(IIR)) = EΠ (u(IIB)) =
minπ∈Π π(IIR) × u(100) = minπ∈Π π(IIB) × u(100) <u(50).
A generalization of the maxmin functional, axiomatized recently in Ghirardato, Mac-
cheroni, and Marinacci (2002), allows the modeler to vary parametrically the DM’s at-
titude to ambiguity while holding the DM’s information, given by Π, constant. The so






where α ∈ [0,1] is the parameter describing the DM’s attitude to ambiguity. The interpre-
tation is the greater the α, the more averse the DM is to the ambiguity in the information
described by Π.W e u s e t h i s α-maxmin functional to model ambiguity aversion in our
contracting model.
In the remaining part of this section, looking ahead to the contracting model, we
show how acts are evaluated given the way beliefs are speciﬁed in that model. In the
contracting model the state space is a doubleton, Ω = {ωL,ωH}. Closed, convex sets
of probabilities on a doubleton state space can be represented parametrically in a way
that provides useful perspective. Let ¯ π ≡ (¯ πL, ¯ πH) be a probability vector on Ω, i.e.,
πL +πH =1 . The set Π describing the DM’s belief is speciﬁed as follows (4 denotes the
two dimensional unit simplex):
Π = Π(¯ π,A) ≡ {(π(ωL),π(ωH)) ∈ 4|π(ωL) ≥ (1 − A)¯ πL;π(ωH) ≥ (1 − A)¯ πH}.
(3)
8Notice, the ambiguity of belief about an arbitrary state ω ∈ Ω, maxπ∈Π π(ω)−minπ∈Π π(ω),
works out to be A.L e t E¯ πu(f) denote the expected utility evaluated with respect to
the probability ¯ π.T o ﬁx ideas it might help to think of Π as a function of the para-
metric speciﬁcation (¯ π,A),w h e r e¯ π denotes the “true probability law” and A ∈ [0,1]
the parameter that describes the ambiguity of belief, the DM’s “perception” of the true









= u(f (ωL)) × min
π∈Π










=( 1 − A)[u(f (ωL)) ¯ πL + u(f (ωH)) ¯ πH]+Amin
ωi
{u(f (ωi))}i=L,H
=( 1 − A)E¯ πu(f)+Amin
ωi
{u(f (ωi))}i=L,H .












{u(f (ωi))}i=L,H . (4)
Notice, the α-maxmin model (just as the MEU model) nests the SEU model. For instance,
with belief speciﬁed as in Π(¯ π,A) (3), if the DM were to perceive no ambiguity at all,
i.e. A =0 , his preferences would be represented by the functional E¯ πu(f).
4 The model and analysis
4.1 Speciﬁcation of the model
This is a model of an optimal contract between a principal who wants to procure a unit
item from an agent. The contract requires the delivery of the speciﬁed item by the agent
to the principal at a future date. The contract also speciﬁes a contingency speciﬁca m o u n t
P, that the principal is required to pay the agent in exchange. The item will be produced
by the agent after the contract is agreed on. The cost of producing the item is uncertain
at the time the contract is signed, though the agent may reduce the cost of production by
exerting eﬀort. The cost function is denoted by C (ω,e),w h e r eω ∈ {ωL,ωH} is a state




CL − e if ω = ωL
CH − e if ω = ωH
8Given that Ω is a doubleton, any closed convex set of probabilities on Ω may be represented by an
appropriate pair of parameters (¯ π,A).
9where, 0 < ˆ e<C L <C H. However, exerting eﬀort gives rise to a disutility, ψ(e)=e2
2 .
The value (to the principal) of the item to be delivered is not subject to uncertainty and
set equal to V. We assume that V> C (ω,0), i.e., tradeable surplus is positive under all
circumstances.
Given our motivation to provide an explanation for contractual form that does not
rely on either asymmetric information or risk aversion, we assume that the principal and
the agent share the same belief and both are risk neutral. The DMs’ common belief is
described by the set of probabilities Π deﬁned in (3). Both the principal and the agent’s
preferences over acts with state contingent payoﬀs are represented by the α-maxmin
functional, which simpliﬁes given our speciﬁcation of beliefs to the form described in . In
the α-maxmin functional representing the principal’s preferences we denote the principal’s
ambiguity aversion attitude by αp. Similarly, the agent’s ambiguity aversion parameter
is denoted αa, and we will assume that αa >α p. The assumption may be interpreted
as saying that given a range of possible cost estimates for the procurement project,
the government, or at the least the bureaucratic authority negotiating the contract on
behalf of the government, would evaluate costs relatively less conservatively (i.e., obtain
the preferred cost evaluation by putting a relatively smaller weight on the high end of
the interval of estimated costs and relatively higher weight on the lower end) than the
contractor ﬁrm. Finally, the assumption of risk neutrality implies the utility function u(·)
i n( 4 )i sj u s tt h ei d e n t i t yf u n c t i o n .
Obviously, the key question of contract design we are interested in, namely, the pro-
vision of ﬁnancial incentives to induce exertion of cost reducing eﬀort, would not even
arise if the eﬀort could be directly contracted on. Hence, it is assumed that the agent’s
eﬀo r tc a n n o ts p e c i ﬁed and veriﬁed in requisite detail and/or cannot be monitored by
the principal, and therefore not contractible. Notice, since cost is only a function of the
state and eﬀort, if it were possible to contract both on costs and ω then it would be
(formally) equivalent to making eﬀort directly contractible, and therefore uninteresting
for our purposes. Hence, we assume that the only veriﬁable/contractible variable is the
realized (accounting) cost of production, ruling out the possibility of contracting on the
state, ω.( I fw em a d eω contractible and C not contractible the analysis would be very
similar.) Finally, for simplicity, we assume that the payments are linear in the realized
cost and write the payment as P (C)=δ + γC,w h e r eδ and γ are terms to be ﬁxed
in the contract. The coeﬃcient of realized cost, γ, may be interpreted as the share of
"cost overrun" (the amount by which the realized costs exceed some ﬁxed, uncontingent
target incorporated in δ) to be reimbursed by the principal. Being a cost share, γ ∈ [0,1].









i) EΠ,αa [P(C (ω,e∗)) − C (ω,e∗)] − ψ(e∗) ≥ 0
ii) e∗ solves max
e∈(0,ˆ e)
EΠ,αa [P(C (ω,e)) − C (ω,e)] − ψ(e) (5)
The ﬁrst constraint in the principal’s problem is a participation constraint while the
second ﬁxes the endogenous choice of eﬀort. Since e∗ is the eﬀort chosen by the agent given
the terms of the contract, the second constraint is, in its spirit, an incentive constraint.
104.2 Characterizing the optimal contract
We ﬁrst analyze the endogenous choice of eﬀort by the agent. Let
¯ C≡ E¯ πC (ω,0) = πLCL + πHCH, (6)
which for the purpose of ﬁxing ideas may be interpreted as the expected cost evaluated by
applying the “true probability” with eﬀort set at its lowest level, 0. Given the functional
forms assumed for P (C) and ψ(e), the agent’s (expected) remuneration from the contract
may be written as:
EΠ,αa [P(C (ω,e)) − C (ω,e)]
= EΠ,αa [δ +( 1− γ)(−C (ω,e))]
= δ +( 1− γ)


(1 − A)((−1)(CL − e)πL +( −1)(CH − e)πH)
+Aαa min{(−1)(CL − e),(−1)(CH − e)}
+A(1 − αa)max{(−1)(CL − e),(−1)(CH − e)}


= δ +( 1− γ)
£
−(1 − A) ¯ C − αaACH − (1 − αa)ACL + e
¤
(7)













Applying the ﬁrst order condition, the optimal eﬀort obtains as:
e
∗ =1− γ ≡ e(γ). (9)
Clearly, the optimal eﬀort, e(γ), is decreasing in γ and given that 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1,i tm u s tb e
that 0 ≤ e(γ) ≤ 1. An economic intuition for e0 (γ) ≤ 1 is that as γ increases a greater
portion of the realized cost is reimbursed by the principal thereby reducing the incentive
to lower the cost by the application of eﬀort since the disutility from reducing eﬀort is
reimbursed less, at the margin.
Notice in any solution of the principal’s problem (5) constraint (i) must hold as an
equality, since otherwise P(C) could be decreased uniformly across states without vio-
lating the constraint while increasing the value of the maximand simultaneously. Hence,




V − EΠ,αpP(C (ω,e(γ)))
¤
s.t. EΠ,αa [P(C (ω,e(γ))) − C (ω,e(γ))] − ψ(e(γ)) = 0 (10)
We may actually write the principal’s problem completely in terms of “standard” expec-
tations operators, thereby converting it into a problem solvable by standard techniques.
Given that the agent’s ex post (state contingent) remuneration is
P(C (ω,e)) − C (ω,e)=δ +( 1− γ)(−C (ω,e)), (11)
and that γ ≥ 0, the “worse” state for the agent is ωH, the high cost state, since,
argmin
ω∈Ω
[δ +( 1− γ)(−C (ω,e))] = ωH.
11Hence, we may rewrite the agent’s expected remuneration as
EΠ,αa [P(C (ω,e(γ))) − C (ω,e(γ))]
=( 1 − A))E¯ π [P(C (ω,e(γ))) − C (ω,e(γ))]
+Aαa [P(C (ωH,e(γ))) − C (ωH,e(γ))]
+A(1 − αa)[P(C (ωL,e(γ))) − C (ωL,e(γ))]. (12)
The high cost state is, of course, also the worse state for the principal. Hence, we may
rewrite the principal’s remuneration as:
V − (1 − A)E¯ πP(C (ω,e(γ)) − AαpP (CH − e(γ)) − A(1 − αp)P (CL − e(γ)) (13)
Therefore, we may rewrite the principal’s problem in (10) with expectation operators
by substituting (13) for the maximand and (12) into the constraint as in (14), below,
max
γ∈[0,1],δ
[V − (1 − A)E¯ πP(C (ω,e(γ)) − AαpP (CH − e(γ)) − A(1 − αp)P (CL − e(γ))]
s.t.
½
(1 − A)E¯ π [P(C (ω,e(γ))) − C (ω,e(γ))] + Aαa [δ +( 1− γ)(e(γ) − CH)]




Solution of the program displayed in (14), details of which are in the Appendix,
yields a full and explicit characterization of the optimal contract, i.e., explicit expressions
for δ and γ in terms of primitive parameters. The following proposition reports the
characterization of γ, arguably the more signiﬁcant ﬁnding.
Proposition 1 In the optimal contract, obtained by solving the constrained maximization
problem shown in (14), the cost share coeﬃcient, γ, is given by
γ =
(
A(αa − αp)(CH − CL) if A < 1
(αa−αp)(CH−CL)
1 if A ≥ 1
(αa−αp)(CH−CL)
where 0 ≤ A ≤ 1.
Clearly, the proportion of realized cost reimbursed by the principal increases as ambi-
guity increases, as the diﬀerence between the ambiguity aversion of the agent and that of
the principal, (αa − αp), becomes larger, and the range of the cost variable increases.9 As
9In a pamphlet, "Guide for Selection of Types of Contracts," the U.S. Air Force suggested some
guidelines for relating the range of cost estimates to the type of contract. The table below (from Moore
(1962), Table 18, page 66) summarizes these suggestions. There is a progression from cost-plus-ﬁxed-fee
(CPFF) to ﬁrm-ﬁxed-price contracts, and these are related directly to the decrease in the range of cost
estimates, which to quote Moore, (is) "a range presumably determinable in part by diﬀerences between
the estimates of the Service and the contractor."
If the range of cost estimates is: Then a suitable contract type would be:
± greater than 15% CPFF
± 15% — ± 3% sundry incentive type contracts
± 3% ﬁrm-ﬁxed-price
Observe if, following Moore, we interpret "a range of cost estimates" as the diﬀerence between the (ex
ante) evaluation of cost preferred by DoD (using the relatively optimistic weight αp) and the evaluation
preferred by the contractor (using the less optimistic weight αa), our formula for γ (in Proposition 1)
would appear to be very consistent with the advice in the "Guide".
12noted in the introduction, the key to the intuition of the result is the trade-oﬀ between
the amount of “ambiguity premium” the principal has to pay and the reduction in cost
eﬀected by the agents eﬀort exertion. The ambiguity premium decreases, ceteris paribus,
as γ increases. On the other hand, the agent expends more eﬀort into cost reduction
the smaller the value of γ. If A =0 , with the implication that γ =0 ,t h e n( f r o me q u a -
tion (24) in the Appendix) we have a ﬁxed price contract with δ = ¯ C − 1/2,w h e r e ¯ C
(deﬁned in (6)) is the the expected cost evaluated by applying the “true probability”.
Given that the contract is ﬁxed price, the agent’s incentive to lower the cost by putting
in eﬀort is at its maximum, leading to a reduction in cost by 1/2 since the agent puts
in the maximal optimal eﬀort, e(γ)|γ=0 =1 . When ambiguity, given by the parameter
A, is high enough, the "pure" cost-plus contract is optimal. Further, ﬁxing the level of
ambiguity, the greater the agent’s ambiguity aversion relative to the principal’s, more
the move toward the cost-plus form. Notice, the extent to which ambiguity has "bite"
depends (positively) on the diﬀerence (CH − CL).E ﬀectively, the greater the spread of
costs in the support, the greater the “scope of play” of ambiguity aversion, because the
cost uncertainty is greater.
W h i l ea m b i g u i t yd o e sn o th a v ea n yb i t ei ft h ep r i n c i p a la n dt h ea g e n th a v ea ne x a c t l y
identical attitude to ambiguity, the qualitative conclusions do not rest on the principal
being ambiguity averse, all that is required is that the agent be more ambiguity averse
than the principal. For instance, if the principal were an SEU maximizer with belief given
by ¯ π (i.e., ambiguity neutral) and the agent were an MEU maximizer (i.e., ambiguity






0 if A =0
A
¡
CH − ¯ C
¢
if 0 < A < 1
(CH− ¯ C)
1 if A ≥ 1
(CH− ¯ C)
Qualitative conclusions are also not altered by adopting more general speciﬁcations for
the disutility of eﬀort, so long as the disutility is increasing and convex. Of course,
the form assumed in the model does have the advantage of facilitating a simple explicit
characterization of γ.
Before closing this section we return to examining why the ambiguity explanation
of cost-plus contracts may not be undermined by a diversiﬁcation argument in the way
risk-aversion based explanation is. The reason why the diversiﬁcation argument does
not work has to do with the way the law of large numbers works for ambiguous risks,
a ss h o w ni nM u k e r j ia n dT a l l o n( 2 0 0 1 ) . 11 Speciﬁcally, let us consider an i.i.d. sequence
{Xn}n≥1 of {0,1}−valued random variables. Suppose, that all the DM’s knows is that
the probability of each Xn lies in the interval [1/4,3/4], i.e., more formally,
1
4
≤ Pr({Xn =0 }) ≤
3
4
and Pr({Xn =1 })=1− Pr({Xn =0 }) for all n ≥ 1.
As is usual with laws of large numbers, the question is about the limiting distribution of
10One way to show this would be to amend the program in (14) by setting A =0in the maximand
and αa =1in the constraint.
11Laws of large numbers for ambiguous beliefs have been studied by, among others, Walley and Fine
(1982) and Marinacci (1999).
13t h es a m p l ea v e r a g e , 1
n
Pn






















In words, (15) says that the DM has a probability 1 belief that the limiting value of the
sample average lies in the (closed) interval [1/4,3/4]. However, unlike in the case belief
is described by a single probability, the DM is not able to further pin down its value.
Thus, even with ambiguous beliefs, where probability of an event is given by an interval,
the law of large numbers works in the usual way in the sense that here too the tails of
the distribution are ‘canceled out’ and the distribution ‘converges on the mean’. But
of course here, given that the DM’s knowledge is consistent with more than one prior,
there is more than one mean to converge on; hence, the convergence is to the set of
means corresponding to the set of priors consistent with the DM’s knowledge. Now, to
ﬁx ideas, think of {Xn}n≥1 as a sequence of i.i.d. payoﬀsf r o mn "projects", representing
n idiosyncratic risks; i.e., each project pays oﬀ either 0 or 1 independent of the outcomes




the payoﬀ from an portfolio consisting of 1/n share of each project. If the investor owning
this diversiﬁed portfolio has an α-maxmin preference (as in (2)) then it follows from (15
) that in the limit as n →∞ , the investor will evaluate the payoﬀ from his portfolio as










Suppose a ﬁrm, in charge of one of the projects with payoﬀ Xk (say), is owned by share-
holders all of whom have identical α-maxmin preferences, where α = αa,a n da l lo f
whom hold diversiﬁed portfolios. Then it follows that the ﬁrm, given the preferences of
its owners, may evaluate the particular risky prospect that it controls, Xk,a se q u a lt o
(3 − 2αa)/4. To put in perspective what the ambiguity is doing to the calculations, sup-
pose the shareholders were risk averse expected utility maximizers and were "informed"







i=1 Xi = µx
¢
=1 . Accordingly, a typical expected util-
ity shareholder, irrespective of his risk aversion, will evaluate ex ante payoﬀ from his




i=1 Xi = µx. Correspondingly, the ﬁrm may
evaluate a particular project according to its expected value and hence, risk aversion does
not remain an issue given the diversiﬁcation. In contrast, with ambiguity, diversiﬁcation
allows for a non-degenerate interval of expected values, even in the limit; thus ambiguity
retains its "bite" even when passing to this limit.
5C o n c l u s i o n
The formal analysis showed that ambiguity has, at least theoretically, determinate eﬀect
on the power of the optimal incentive scheme incorporated in procurement contracts. We
found that the more the ambiguity the lower the power of incentives incorporated, with
high enough ambiguity resulting in the pure cost-plus form. On the basis of institutional
14and statistical detail presented in Section 2, it seems possible to argue that this theoretical
eﬀect is a better explanation for cost-plus contracts, compared to the alternative theories,
in the speciﬁcc o n t e x tof R&D procurement.
Finally, while there is a vast literature on ambiguity aversion (see Camerer (1995)),
and indeed of the many other departures from SEU, that convincingly establishes both,
the theoretical sophistication of the ideas as well as their importance in laboratory set-
tings, this work has had little impact on the way that economics is done. In large part
this is because there have been relatively few demonstrations that economically impor-
tant phenomena that are only poorly understood on the basis of standard theory, can be
understood better by using models other than the standard one (SEU).12 This paper is a
contribution that hopes to go some way in bridging this gap, especially as a complement
to the ﬁnding in Mukerji (1998). That paper showed that ambiguity aversion could cause
incentive contracts facilitating vertical purchaser/supplier relationships to have too little
power, thereby providing an understanding of the link between uncertainty and vertical
integration. There is empirical evidence suggesting that provision of incentives for R&D
may be a particularly diﬃcult problem in purchaser/supplier relationships. For example,
Monteverde and Teece (1982) show that large automotive ﬁrms are much more likely to
produce a component in-house if it involves signiﬁcant R&D. It is of interest to note that
ambiguity aversion explains this empirical regularity about R&D production (on the ba-
sis of results in Mukerji (1998)), just as it explains weak incentives incorporated in R&D
procurement contracts.
6 Appendix: Solution of the optimization program
a sg i v e ni n( 1 4 )
The Lagrangian, L, for the maximization program, with λ denoting the Lagrange multi-
plier, may written as follows:
L(δ,γ,λ)=V − (1 − A)E¯ πP(C (ω,e(γ)))
+Aαp min{[−P (CL − e(γ))],[−P (CH − e(γ))]}
+A(1 − αp)max{[−P (CL − e(γ))],[−P (CH − e(γ))]}
−λ[(1 − A)E¯ π [P(C (ω,e(γ))) − C (ω,e(γ))] + Aαa [δ +( 1− γ)(e(γ) − CH)]






L = V − (1 − A)E¯ πP(C (ω,e(γ)) − AαpP (CH − e(γ))
−A(1 − αp)P (CL − e(γ)) − λ[(1 − A)E¯ πP(C (ω,e(γ))
−(1 − A)E¯ πC (ω,e(γ)) + Aαa [δ +( 1− γ)(e(γ) − CH)]





12Though, lately, the list of papers exploring the implications of the idea of ambiguity aversion in
economic context, has been growing. For an account of the literature see Mukerji and Tallon (2003).
15The ﬁrst order conditions are obtained by taking derivative of the expression for L in
(16) with respect to δ and γ. Recall, P(C (ω,e(γ))) = δ + γC(ω,e(γ)). Hence,
∂L
∂δ
= −1 − λ =0⇒ λ = −1. (17)
∂L
∂γ




∂ [P (CH − e(γ))]
∂γ
− A(1 − αp)









∂ [(1 − γ)(e(γ) − CH)]
∂γ
+A(1 − αa)











∂ [δ + γ (CH − e(γ))]
∂γ
− A(1 − αp)






∂ [(1 − γ)(e(γ) − CH)]
∂γ
+A(1 − αa)




∂ [γ (CH − e(γ))]
∂γ
− A(1 − αp)






∂ [(1 − γ)(CH − e(γ))]
∂γ
−A(1 − αa)




∂ [γ (CH − e(γ))]
∂γ
− A(1 − αp)














+ A(1 − αa)
∂ [γ(CL − e(γ))]
∂γ
+( 1− γ)=0
⇒ A(αa − αp)
∂ [γ (CH − e(γ))]
∂γ
− A(αa − αp)
















16∂ [γ (CH − e(γ))]
∂γ
= CH − 1+2 γ, (20)
∂ [γ (CL − e(γ))]
∂γ
= CL − 1+2 γ. (21)
Hence, substituting (19), (20), (21) in (18), we obtain,
∂L
∂γ
= A(αa − αp)(CH − 1+2 γ) − A(αa − αp)(CL − 1+2 γ)
− (1 − A) − Aαa−A(1 − αa)+( 1− γ)=0
⇒ γ = A(αa − αp)(CH − CL)
Notice, if it is the case that A > 1
(αa−αp)(CH−CL),t h e n∂L
∂γ (= A(αa − αp)(CH − CL) − γ)




A(αa − αp)(CH − CL) A < 1
(αa−αp)(CH−CL)
1 if A ≥ 1
(αa−αp)(CH−CL)
(22)
And, on simplifying the constraint equation in (14) we obtain,
(1 − A)E¯ πP(C (ω,e(γ)) − (1 − A)E¯ πC (ω,e(γ))
+Aαa [δ +( 1− γ)(e(γ) − CH)]






⇒ (1 − A)[E¯ π (δ + γ(C (ω,e(γ))) − E¯ πC (ω,e(γ))]
+Aαa [δ +( 1− γ)((1 − γ) − CH)]






⇒ (1 − A)
£
δ − (1 − γ)(¯ C − (1 − γ))
¤
+Aαa [δ +( 1− γ)((1 − γ) − CH)]





⇒ (1 − A)
£
δ − (1 − γ)(¯ C − (1 − γ))
¤
+ Aαa [δ +( 1− γ)((1 − γ) − CH)]





Solving the simpliﬁed constraint equation (23) for δ we obtain:
δ = −1
2 + ¯ C + −1
2γ2 − γ ¯ C + ACL − AγCL − AαaCL
+AαaγCL + AαaCH − A ¯ C − AαaγCH + Aγ ¯ C (24)
where, γ is as found in (22).
17The second order conditions may be checked by considering the determinant of the
relevant bordered Hessian :
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